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abstract
This introduction provides an analytical back ground for the notion of 
vulnerability as it is currently perceived mainly in social sciences, ethics, 
philosophy, queer studies and governmentality. Used both as descriptive 
and normative term, vulnerability, along with resilience and policy 
management, has acquired political dimensions, which are distant from 
those given by the philosophers Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas. 
In present day social and political discussions vulnerability has gained 
enormous popularity and seems to be a genuine “sticky concept”, an 
adhesive cluster of heterogeneous conceptual elements.
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INTRODUCTION1
Vulnerability is about the porousness of bound­
aries.2 This is the argument that runs through 
this special issue. Nature, minds, humans, 
nonhumans, and the earth are open and 
exposed to the environment and towards other 
beings, nonbeings and systems. In addition to 
vulnerability, other concepts like precariosity, 
fragility, risk, and resilience are also taken up 
in the discussions (Butler 2009; Fineman 2008; 
Sen 1982; Douglas 1966; Evans and Reid 
2015; Brunila and Rossi 2018). The concept 
of resilience has outlined over the past two 
decades the conceptual background that makes 
comprehensible the important cluster of their 
mutual relationships.
Vulnerability as a notion is neutral but it is 
applied in descriptive and normative ways. It has 
multiple meanings that vary in shifting contexts. 
However, in scientific, political, and public 
discussions, vulnerability has mostly taken on 
a ‘dark’ character, as the anthropologist Sherry 
Ortner (2016) puts it, because what is often 
emphasized is the openness to danger, disaster, 
suffering, and social control, or, with weakness 
or lack of agency. However, the core of the 
argument in this special issue deviates from this: 
being exposed signifies a contingent possibility 
of openness towards the world.3 Vulnerability 
also includes the ability to become animated 
and affected, to be able to bring things together 
and to mobilize.4 Vulnerability allows contagion; 
vulnerability touches. This special issue emphasizes 
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vulnerability as relational, as the capacity and 
necessity to relate to, and to be conditioned by 
and dependent on known and unknown others. 
Relationality is also about processes, which 
consent to mediation between vulnerability as 
a universal, and as a specific condition shaped by 
its social, political, and cultural contexts.5 The 
twin concept of precariosity often overlaps with 
vulnerability in anthropological discussions. As 
Tsing (2015: 29) puts it, we need to acknowledge 
our vulnerability to others: ‘In order to survive, 
we need help and help is always in the service 
of another, with or without intent’. In this 
ontological meaning, relationality opens up 
a view on vulnerability as its very condition. 
Along with resilience, a notion that is 
‘equivalent but opposite’ to vulnerability, as 
Adger (2000) puts it, interest in vulnerability as 
a topic has increased tremendously over the last 
few decades, in the domains of the environment, 
climate, and information technology research in 
addition to risk, catastrophe and disaster research 
and their prevention practices. Vulnerability 
has become a commonplace in several political 
and social accounts, in scientific and public 
discussions notably in ecological, environmental, 
ethical, health, educational and social policy, legal 
politics and policies, in immigration and refugee 
issues and in global debates concerning violence 
and exclusion, along with resilience in crisis 
management. 
A search on vulnerability solely in English 
social science databases gives a result of more 
than 189,484 entries, an increase of almost 80 % 
from the early 1990s. The search on resilience 
gives 980,5656 entries just in the social science 
databases alone. Anthropologists have been 
interested in the ways in which various kinds of 
vulnerabilities are performed and produced as 
sets of material conditions and discourses, about 
‘what vulnerability is and what it does’, as the 
research program ‘Engaging vulnerability’7 puts 
it. Yet, vulnerability is a truly ‘sticky concept’, 
a cluster of heterogeneous conceptual elements 
like an adhesive tape (Masscehelein 2011: 13; 
see also Ahmed 2014: 91). Stickiness is about 
the quality of the notion that along its travel 
across the disciplines attracts new associations 
and variations which, according to Masschelein 
(2011) are not always motivated by conscious 
or deliberative moves. In addition to embedded 
affectivity this ensures the dynamism of the 
concept. Due to the multiplicity of meanings, 
vulnerability is an extremely powerful notion. 
At least five themes of vulnerability relevant 
for current anthropological debates can be 
listed. First, the Anthropocene, climate change8 
and rearmament; second, livable lives, global 
violence, contentious politics, and resistance; 
third, governmentality, classification, and control; 
fourth, subjectivity and agency and fifth, what is 
called the ‘debate on the end of the world’ (see 
e.g. Tsing, ibid.) Vulnerability as a theme runs 
through all of them. 
By focusing especially on the third 
and fourth themes listed above, this special 
issue examines relationality as how and why 
vulnerability matters. The aim of this issue is 
to discuss vulnerability in a dialogue between 
researchers in anthropology, philosophy, ethics, 
and social policy and give the philosophical and 
ethnographic approaches a space to talk to each 
other. The power of anthropological research is 
to study its objects in subtle and dense contexts 
and to bring detailed explorations to abstract 
philosophical theorizing. The contributors of 
this special issue ask questions about what is 
vulnerability. What does it do? How is it described 
and what kinds of contribution do the various 
descriptions provide to help us understand this 
virtual Zeitgeist we live by (Brown, Ecclestone and 
Emmel 2017)? How is vulnerability used for the 
purposes of power? In what ways does the notion 
both hide and lay bare the core cultural values 
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of autonomy, dependency, and power? In what 
ways does it work as a cultural critique? By asking 
questions such as these, the authors of this issue 
want to challenge and heighten the significance of 
vulnerability both as an interdisciplinary research 
area and as a significant aspect of anthropology.9 
The current debates on vulnerability 
contain a myriad controversial definitions and 
understandings. As a sticky concept vulnerability 
may refer to a universal condition but also to 
a phenomenon, policy imperative, psychoemo­
tional trait, or to an experience at an individual, 
inter subjective, or a population level, and to 
a political ontology. Besides being a focus of 
concern in a variety of separate academic domains, 
vulnerability is also an interdisciplinary notion, 
a true boundary concept (Gieryn 1983: 792) 
in the meaning of negotiations between 
‘demarcations of disciplines, specialties, or 
theoretical orientations between and across 
several boundaries within science’. My aim in 
this introduction is to track vulnerability through 
the relevant literature that touches upon the 
questions presented above and, by doing so, give 
a background to the authors’ approaches. 
In what follows, in order to give a general 
background for the contributing articles, 
I outline an itinerary of the notion through 
some of its history as well as the paths across the 
relevant scholarly disciplines pertinent for the 
understanding of the notion as a dispositive.10 
Moreover, by asking what vulnerability does, 
I sketch out the use of vulnerability in current 
governmentality and policy making. 
abOUT hISTORICal ORIGINS 
The concept of vulnerability stems from two 
main intellectual roots. The first springs from 
philosophical ontological discussions, notably 
from the works of Hannah Arendt (1958) 
and Emmanuel Levinas (1969 [1961]; 2003 
[1972]) in which vulnerability as vulnus,11 
a wound, is understood as a human universal, as 
inherent in life. According to Arendt,12 what is 
unique to the human condition is vulnerability. 
As exposed to plurality and unpredictability, 
vulnerability comprises the condition of action 
and thinking.13 
Because the actor always moves among 
and in relation to other acting beings, he is 
never merely a “doer” but always and at the 
same time a sufferer. To do and to suffer are 
like opposite sides of the same coin, and 
the story that an act starts is composed of 
its consequent deeds and sufferings. These 
consequences are boundless, because action, 
though it may proceed from nowhere, so 
to speak, acts into a medium where every 
reaction becomes a chain reaction and 
where every process is the cause of new 
processes. (Arendt 1958: 190) 
Levinas’s approach to vulnerability originates 
from a different perspective. Constituting the 
ground of his ethics, vulnerability is a call; it is 
shared in proximity to the other’s face. Levinas 
finds there the source of responsibility that is 
asymmetrical and ‘extends to responsibility 
for the other’s responsibility’ (Levinas 2003 
[1972]: 25). Both Arendt’s and Levinas’s 
understanding of vulnerability is grounded on 
relationality. As Robert Bernasconi concludes 
his article, ‘To that extent my vulnerability is 
the site of relationality because its basis lies 
in the other’s vulnerability, in her pain’. Elisa 
Aaltola in her article adds the Levinasian idea 
of shared vulnerability to the discussion of 
relationality and Simone Weil’s ways of thinking 
about vulnerability as communality between all 
individuals. Vulnerability enhances attentiveness, 
which for Weil means openness to the other and 
to love. In order to be affected by other beings, 
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one must actively open up to others, taking the 
risk of embracing one’s lack of control, which 
in turn holds the promise of being transformed 
by new encounters. Vulnerability refers both to 
the human condition and to affectability—one’s 
openness to the world. Later philosophers such 
as Judith Butler (2009) have elaborated these 
thoughts towards a social and political condition 
in our lives (see Karhu 2017: 74).
The second root of vulnerability originates 
from the sciences, notably ecology, geography, and 
later the studies of risk, disaster, natural hazards, 
and the insecurity of technological systems (see 
Burton et. al 1978; Bankoff 2007). Together with 
adaptation and balance, vulnerability has been 
used as a core concept in the systems theoretical 
approaches to the study of multiple systems. From 
the early works of Blaikie et al. (1994) vulnerability 
was considered in the cross­illumination of social, 
political, natural, and economic factors in the 
study of people at risk. In these debates, the 
impact of poverty and famine was important both 
in cultural geography and development studies 
(Chambers 1989; Sen 1982). Later, vulnerability, 
adaptation and resilience fleshed out a tripartite 
conceptual content to describe the effects of 
ecological and ensuing social changes as well as 
the development of strategies to reduce the impact 
of risk and harm. Adaptation and vulnerability as 
individual strategies and traits, respectively, and 
were made use of in the research in development 
psychology and stress research and later in health 
prevention research (e.g. Antonovski 1979).
For the social sciences, vulnerability became 
an important notion through Amartya Sen’s 
(1982) works on famine and poverty in the field 
of development studies.14 Sen’s definition of 
vulnerability comprises a double, a characteristic 
that runs through ‘the social life’ of the 
notion: vulnerability is about being exposed and 
about relations, it includes both the structural 
natural, social, and political side and ‘the internal 
side of being at risk with deficient means to cope 
with deficiently functioning social institutions’ 
(see e.g. Watts and Bohl 1999). For humans 
and nonhumans who are dependent on others 
to survive and in need of some basic provision, 
society, cultures, and communities are ways of 
handling threats and risks. Later, the growing 
discussions of climate change, nuclear rearmament, 
and more generally the Anthropocene have 
increased concerns about the vulnerability of the 
cosmos. Both human and non­human beings are 
being threatened and new ways to deal with this 
threat are needed. In addition to research, public 
and popular media, as well as social and political 
institutions, organizations, and movements need 
to be involved. 
VUlNERabIlITy aND  
ThE EmpIRICal 
Vulnerability has been widely used, both 
descriptively and normatively, for social and 
political classification of populations, and can 
also be comprehended as a quality, status, or 
identity (Virokannas, Liuski and Kuronen 
2018). The sociologist of health, Graham 
Scambler (2019), lists seven different types or 
qualities of vulnerability, which in his opinion 
have a social impact that is tantamount to harm 
on health at the levels of structure, culture, or 
agency. His analysis reflects a more general 
empirical understanding of vulnerability15 
as something threatening or negative, as ‘a 
typology that is useful for the sociological 
explanations of vulnerability­induced health 
disadvantage’ (Scambler 2019: 1). Scambler’s 
analysis represents the general understanding 
of vulnerability as negative, a view that is 
quite common in health and risk research. It is 
a common tool of governance and is currently 
a frequently applied vehicle for classification 
of people ‘at risk’. I will return to this theme in 
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more detail in the section ‘Vulnerability does’. 
However, such classifications of vulnerability 
have been intensely criticized by social and 
political scientists (Brown 2011; Bledsoe 
2012; Brown, Ecclestone and Emmel 2017). 
Vulnerability as a condition is not neutral but 
is politically mediated and consequently not 
suitable for classificatory purposes. According 
to Brown (2011: 314), rather than being an 
innocent concept, the notion of vulnerability 
is ‘loaded with political, moral, and practical 
implications’. Classifications can be a threat 
to social justice, especially to people and 
groups who are classified without their emic 
contribution. 
Brown identifies three main objections to 
the use of ‘vulnerability’ as a classificatory term: 
firstly, it is paternalistic and offensive; secondly, 
it is closely aligned to technologies of social 
control; and lastly, labeling individuals or groups 
as ‘vulnerable’ is exclusionary and potentially 
stigmatizing. Tiia Sudenkaarne in this special issue 
illuminates the stigmatizing situation in ethics as 
challenged in queer people’s narratives. Kristiina 
Brunila demonstrates how in sociology and 
philosophy studies in education, vulnerability has 
been studied as a policy imperative that turns the 
notion into a psychoemotional and individualized 
problem and she shows how categorization as 
vulnerable has effects on those to whom it is 
ascribed (Brunila and Rossi 2018; Brunila et al 
in this special issue). In his intersectional analysis 
on racism in South Africa in this issue, Robert 
Bernasconi describes how such categorization 
may overlook the very real vulnerability of some 
others, who are thus put at even greater risk and 
deprived of access to essential resources. 
For several political thinkers, vulnerability is 
‘made’ in regimes of power and consequently, dif­
ferently distributed among humans (Butler 2009; 
Ferrarese 2009). Vulnerability as a descriptive 
term, or as a ‘type’, as Scambler (2019) puts it, is 
applied to persons considered dependent, fragile, 
or threatened for one reason or another. It is 
also applied to surroundings that are considered 
precarious; and to persons classified as deviant, 
poor, and excluded, in other words to ‘others’. 
In this context, several anthropologists have 
highlighted the lack of an emic dimension to the 
concept and its consequences.
EThICal appROaChES  
aND RElaTIONalITy
The moral and legal philosopher Martha 
Albertson Fineman, founder of the Vulnerability 
and the Human Condition Initiative,16 
considers vulnerability to be at the core of the 
legal subject. Significantly, she emphasizes 
cultural values when defining vulnerability 
(see also Cooke 2017). According to Fineman, 
‘vulnerability is inherent in life but autonomy 
is not. The interpretation of vulnerability as 
a weakness is cultural and autonomy is a 
product of social policy’ (Fineman 2008: 23). 
She also argues that what is understood 
as a ‘vulnerable subject’ must replace the 
autonomous and independent subject asserted 
in the liberal tradition (Fineman 2008: 1–2). To 
richly theorize the concept of vulnerability is to 
develop a more complex subject around which 
to build social policy and law. 
In moral theory and ethics, vulnerability 
has raised challenges regarding this very question. 
In this special issue, Susanne Uusitalo and 
Tiia Sudenkaarne discuss this tension from the 
perspectives of addiction and queer ethics and 
practice, respectively. 
Another prominent critical discussion of 
autonomous, sovereign, and rational agency was 
launched by Alistair MacIntyre (1999). From 
the perspective of human rights, Bryan Turner 
(2006) also questions the notion of autonomous 
agency from the viewpoint of dependence and 
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relationality, both of which he understands as 
dimensions of vulnerability. They comprise 
a necessary condition for agency that is possible 
not in solitude but by means of others, pivoting 
on the web of relations. Vulnerability as relational 
refers both to the constitution of agency and to 
human affectability. Following these precepts, 
MacIntyre makes relationality the basis of any 




In addition to the ethical approaches to 
vulnerability, several political thinkers especially 
in feminist philosophy and political theory 
emphasize vulnerability as more than ‘a good 
sentiment’, as Estelle Ferrarese (2016: 149) 
puts it. For these debates, the concern of the 
possibility of a vulnerable political subject is at 
stake. Despite of criticism, Ferrarese considers 
possibilities for the use of the notion and 
suggests vulnerability as a category with which 
to undo the world as it is. How vulnerability 
is embedded in a web of political relations is 
mostly neglected in social debates. Instead of 
an object of pity or perhaps a target of solely 
empathy, she considers vulnerability a mutual 
presupposition of autonomy for political theory. 
Ferrarese points to a critique of the core values 
in the ways of thinking of the actor and agency 
as lacking the body, something unbound and 
solipsist. These critical ways of thinking are 
further developed in the discussions put forward 
by Erinn Gilson (2014). Taika Bottner in this 
special issues makes use of these ideas for the 
study of agency of chronically ill persons with 
dementia. 
For thinkers such as Judith Butler, vulnera­
bility as a political concept is a social and 
political condition of life. Far from being merely 
existential, she understands vulnerability to be 
differentially distributed globally through polit­
ical regimes and politics. Besides vulnerability, 
Butler uses the concept of precarity to theorize 
the ways vulnerability is unevenly distributed 
across populations and to describe the social and 
political conditions under which lives become 
unlivable (2009: 25–26). What, in other words, 
does vulnerability in the form of violence, 
war, failing networks, poverty, imprisonment, 
starvation, exposure to illness, infirmity, and death 
do to the people who are directly affected? Butler’s 
thoughts have inspired several scholars who work 
with studies of violence. Satu Venäläinen’s article 
in this issue discusses women imprisoned for 
violent crimes. She describes how a relevant part 
of the culturally circulating understandings about 
gender and violence reflects on ways women who 
have committed violent crimes are perceived and 
related to, and how their self­perceptions and 
social orientations become shaped. This results 
in othering discourses about women convicted 
of violent crimes as inhumanly deviant, which 
particularly in the Finnish context entwines with 
notions about ‘strong Finnish women’ that are 
effective both in denying women’s vulnerability in 
relation to violence and in constituting positions 
of victims as shameful. The dynamics of othering 
are linked to the trouble with vulnerability 
in Western thought due to the ways in which 
its recognition goes against liberal­humanist 
valuation of autonomy and agency.
Considering vulnerability as a political 
concept, at least two avenues of thoughts 
are opened up. First, what does it mean to 
understand vulnerability politically, in terms 
of power, resistance, and agency? Butler 
(2016: 22–24) herself highlights vulnerability in 
relation to resistance and contentious politics. In 
feminist theories, vulnerability is opposed mainly 
because it is considered to be dependency and 
victimhood, the antitheses of agency—because 
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agency in e.g. feminist literature is considered 
to be incompatible with vulnerability (Martinez 
2018; Mahmood 2005). In politics, people want 
to be regarded as agentic, as those who are acting 
but are not acted upon. However, vulnerability is 
an important part of the very meaning of political 
resistance; it is an embodied enactment. Second, 
Butler points out that vulnerability and resistance 
are not solely existential conditions of the body 
but aspects in a set of relations connecting the 
body to contentious politics, constituted by other 
bodies, processes, and political structures (Butler, 
Gambetti and Sabsay 2016; see Lasczkowski 
2017). Seen from this perspective, vulnerability 
as relational pierces through the body and also 
through the social and political conditions of life. 
During the last couple of decades, 
vulnerability as a political notion has raised 
intense discussions. Papers on this theme were also 
presented in the seminar ‘How does vulnerability 
matter?’ that this special issue is based on. Some 
authors argue that vulnerability animates political 
critique and is, on many occasions, a powerful 
vehicle of social and political change. Tiia 
Sudenkaarne, for example, refers to queer activism 
in her article. Several current political reflections 
on vulnerability touch upon what vulnerability 
does in terms of power, resistance, and agency. 
Some, like Butler (2004) and Laszczkowski 
(2017, also 2019), are interested in what Butler 
calls the contentious politics of everyday life, 
a term that has implications for everyday life 
and the ways that people might live in a radically 
restructured world. New questions are brought to 
the discussions, such as what does the affective 
power of vulnerability consist of? What is the 
power of political language of vulnerability that 
is so powerfully capable of touch, to contaminate 
and to mobilize acts (see Gilson 2018: 3)?
hOw VUlNERabIlITy 
ENTERED aNThROpOlOGy
Since its early history, vulnerability—understood 
in a general descriptive way as the condition 
of the poor or the excluded—has been vital 
for anthropological research. Durkheim (1951 
[1897]) defines anomie as a result of insufficient 
social integration, and as an indicator of what 
he calls the moral constitution of society. 
Durkheim’s understanding of anomie has served 
as a kind of undercurrent for anthropological 
research on vulnerability as a social condition of 
the excluded. However, vulnerability as such has 
not been much theorized in the anthropological 
corpus (about this, see Robbins 2013; Ortner 
2016). The other point in Durkheim’s 
definition relevant for anthropology is morality. 
Morality is something that has persisted in 
anthropological thinking and has modified 
the description of the ethnographer’s position, 
frequently defined as the advocate of the studied, 
marginalized, peoples with the task of letting 
their voices be heard. In general, vulnerability 
calls for benevolent acts and help. The role of 
the ethnographer is also described as vulnerable 
(e.g. Behar 1996). Delineating ‘the moral turn’ 
in anthropology, Fassin (2012: 3) makes the 
claim that the discipline is morally committed, 
at times explicitly: ‘Anthropologists, too, have 
often acted as moral agents. They have adopted 
moral views and defended moral causes’ (see 
also Farmer 2004).
GOOD bUT DaRk? 
Vulnerability has been linked with morality in 
a sense that is unique for Western anthropology 
compared with other social science disciplines. 
The link is interesting and worth being 
developed further. Today’s discussions of the 
‘moral turn’ in anthropology—in contrast to 
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the ‘ethical turn’, launched by Kapferer and 
Gold (eds. 2018)—follows the tracks of ‘the 
suffering school’, prominent especially in US 
anthropology from the late 1980s, and launched 
by the collaborative work of Arthur Kleinman 
(1997), Veena Das, and Stanley Cavell. In their 
edited volume Social Suffering (1996: 3), they 
delineate their enterprise as ‘seeking to explore 
suffering as a social experience in a stream of 
enquiry’. They define suffering at three levels: 
first, as an intersubjective experience and second, 
as an umbrella category that ties together 
different kinds of human problems that create 
pain, distress, and other trials that people must 
undergo and endure (Kleinman 1997: 15). 
Third, suffering is also social, it has a social 
history and moral career. Morality, according 
to Kleinman, is a process of interaction that 
results from an inter­human experience of the 
Other’s suffering (ibid., 66). Defined in this 
way, social suffering is close to how Veena 
Das (1996; 2007) approaches the relationship 
between social suffering and vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is, however, only rarely thematized 
by authors and social suffering is not explicitly 
elaborated in relation to vulnerability in these 
discussions (see also Jackson 1998; 2011; 2013; 
Biehl 2005). In this special issue, Elisa Aaltola 
makes an important contribution by analyzing 
three Western cultural narratives of suffering, 
portraying vulnerability through them. It is 
precisely through vulnerability that suffering 
exists: ‘vulnerable creatures subject to forces 
beyond our control also renders us prone to pain 
and anguish’.
To conclude, in the anthropological enter­
prise, vulnerability has mainly been ‘good and 
dark’, a descriptive moral term for describing 
the quality of life and the condition of the poor 
and excluded17 (see Fassin 2012; Luhrmann 
2016). Anthropologists, especially those who 
work with global aid programs, have been 
reluctant to deal explicitly with ‘vulnerability’ 
because of its character as a policy concept that 
has little relevance in local usage or in discourse 
outside of aid industries (Payne 2012). This also 
clearly points to the Western governmentality 
underpinnings of vulnerability. 
A relational approach to vulnerability 
and precariosity that differs from the North 
American discussions above, originates from 
the post­war Italian anthropology influenced by 
Gramsci (de Martino 2015 [1959]; 2005 [1961]). 
Vulnerability may be provoked by illness, death, 
poverty, or other social or personal situations 
where ‘one’s ability to maintain cultural processes 
is threatened’ (de Martino 2015: 16). The risk of 
an existential dilemma touches upon the ways 
in which we are human beings. On the basis 
of his ethnographic research in southern Italy, 
de Martino considered human life precarious 
because in so many situations the individual may 
be in constant danger of losing his or her presence, 
la presenza, the ability to be an active agent in the 
world and in history. In his studies on miseria in 
southern Italy, de Martino focused his interest on 
human agency in vulnerable situations. Elements 
and contributing factors may be played out in 
several everyday situations that threaten one’s 
own agency, that is, one’s ability to act on the 
world rather than simply remaining a passive 
object of circumstances. Social interactions with 
the aim of protecting a person’s tenuous being 
in the world constitute a cultural core of human 
agency. Hence, agency is something which does 
not proceed in isolation, but takes place in 
a society, in a relational cultural context where 
there are already meaningful and intelligible 
modes of holding on to a world, having a grip 
on it within social interactions. Vulnerability and 
precariosity, understood in this way, are about 
being open to something, but the nature of this 
something is only determined in concrete social 
circumstances. 
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In several of his works de Martino has 
thematized the relationship between the 
existential crisis of human beings in the social 
and political context of the precarious Italian 
South as ‘the crisis of presence’. As a historian of 
religion and an ethnographer, he has emphasized 
the role of religion as common social and cultural 
practices and acts. Studying the practices of 
religious rituals in the everyday, de Martino does 
not make a distinction between Catholicism, 
popular religion, or magic (see Gramsci 1973; 
especially Chapter III).18 In a world where 
one’s presence is not ultimately guaranteed, 
one is always in the process of constituting and 
maintaining oneself together with others within 
a delicate balance. Meanwhile the world itself is 
entangled with the ongoing drama into which 
people are thrown, consisting of illness, poverty, 
the threat of death, pain, and a sense of becoming 
overwhelmed. What is relevant for the relational 
way of thinking about vulnerability is that agency 
means the ability to fight for at least the minimal, 
namely a grip on the world. This grip is not 
something already there but is made and re-made 
continuously in intersubjective interactions with 
other people in the human world. 
VUlNERabIlITy DOES
In biopolitics19 and neoliberal governmentality, 
vulnerability has been increasingly deployed in 
the classification and consequent management 
and control of people. Characteristic for 
the classification is that it is not carried out 
by ‘vulnerable’ people themselves but by the 
governmental institutions from the outside. 
Consequently, as a group people who are 
disabled, elderly, young, women, perhaps queer 
or unemployed—just to mention a few of the 
qualities that are made use of in the classification 
procedures—are considered vulnerable and, 
simultaneously, observable targets for societal 
or political regulation and control. Within the 
current governmental politics of austerity, the 
notion of vulnerability in policy language 
appears to be connected to target funds. 
Consequently, such programs focus not only on 
the most vulnerable, who perhaps would be in 
need of protection, but also on people with new 
kinds of ‘psychosocial problems’, such as obesity, 
fatigue, sleep problems, or depression. 
This kind of classification frequently 
accomplishes labeling and unwanted identity, such 
as victimhood and consequently, identity politics 
based on the definition from outside. Kristiina 
Brunila and Leena­Maija Rossi (2018; also Brunila 
et al. in this special issue) have argued that in 
terms of identity politics there is a tendency for 
it to become a part of the ethos of vulnerability 
in the neoliberal order. There is concern that in 
the neoliberal order, identity politics is focusing 
on the individualized and inherent self by 
referring to a specific psychological form and by a 
therapeutic discourse of assumed psychoemotional 
vulnerability. Consequently, the position from 
which people get heard is established by recogniz­
ing their psychoemotional vulnerabilities, injuries, 
and emotional problems. In recent social and 
political situations, people tend increasingly to 
claim rights, status, or privileges on the basis of 
victimized identity (see Koivunen, Kyrölä and 
Ryberg 2018). The claims are increasingly based 
on trauma or inherent vulnerability. The ethos of 
vulnerability plays an increasingly decisive role in 
shaping e.g. social and welfare, education, and 
policy health politics (Beddoe 2013; Brown 2011; 
Honkasalo 2017; see Brunila et al. in this special 
issue). Vulnerabilizing problems, policies, and 
practices inadvertently shape and limit subjectivity 
and agency (see Bottner in this special issue). This 
is why the authors argue that vulnerability needs a 
further analysis because neoliberal discourses work 
by disguising their real purposes, namely providing 
legitimation for shaping people to become more 
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governable and eventually more economically 
productive subjects.
Furthermore, Bronwyn Davies et. al. (2005) 
have argued that the neoliberal discourse shifts 
governments and their subjects towards thinking 
of survival as an individual responsibility. This is 
a crucial element of resilience in the neoliberal 
order and as a form of cruel optimism—the 
removal of dependence on the social fabric 
combined with the dream of wealth and 
possessions for each individual who ‘gets it right’ 
(see Berlant 2011). According to Davies et al. 
(2005), vulnerability is ideologically closely tied 
to individual responsibility, which again is the 
central tenet of neoliberal subjectivity; workers are 
disposable and there is no obligation on the part 
of the ‘social fabric’ to take care of the disposed. 
Therefore, the neoliberal subject becomes both 
vulnerable to disposability and rejection by 
those with economic power and thus, necessarily, 
competitive. The notion of social responsibility is 
transformed into the individual’s responsibility 
for one’s individual survival. This process is thus 
constructed not solely as moral, but as economic 
survival (Davies et al. 2005: 9).
The philosopher of science Ian Hacking, well 
known for his works on contemporary thought 
and reasoning, has been consistently curious 
about how science seeks to tame chance and its 
ways of creating ‘kinds of people that in a certain 
sense did not exist before’ (2006: 3). This is what 
he calls ‘making up people’. Hacking’s ideas 
are important in making sense of vulnerability, 
and his thoughts have been further elaborated 
especially in the literature of governmentality 
(Rose 2007). 
Hacking argues that today’s understanding 
of causal processes in human affairs relies 
crucially on concepts of ‘human kinds’, which 
are a product of the modern social sciences, with 
their concern for classification, quantification, 
and intervention. Eating disorders, ADHD and 
autism are examples of such recently established 
‘human kinds’. Vulnerability and precariousness 
can be added to the list of these ‘kinds’. Hacking’s 
idea is that instead of being ‘natural kinds’, what 
happens with ‘kinds’ is that they become moving 
targets because our investigations interact with 
them, and consequently change them. And since 
they are changed, they are not quite the same 
‘kind’ as before. The target has moved, and this is 
what he calls the ‘looping effect’. 
What distinguishes human kinds from 
‘natural kinds’, is that they include the results 
of the construction by the classificatory and 
scientific processes, i.e. the looping. As a result of 
coming into existence through the social scientists’ 
classifications, human kinds also change the 
people thus classified. Vulnerability is an example 
par excellence of ‘classification, quantification, 
and intervention’. People who were previously 
considered ‘at risk’, are changed as a population 
and some of the new groups, such as migrants 
and refugees, are not properly classified solely 
by being ‘at risk’. Risk as a technological term 
has gradually changed to vulnerability, and by 
that classificatory principle people are grouped 
together. Only rarely does academic research or 
policy making ask about the respondents’ own 
definitions of vulnerability. This in practice means 
e.g. that according to several EU documents20 
migrants are considered equally vulnerable by 
both practitioners and researchers in a variety 
of ways. They are vulnerable by being at risk in 
accessing services and resources, by being exposed 
to exploitation on migration routes, by facing 
political prosecution in their home countries, or 
through their specific bodily or psychological 
conditions. 
Consequently, vulnerability as a tool of clas­
sification and consequent control and manage­
ment of the population groups is effective 
compared with its predecessor, risk. In the 
following, I take an example of the change in 
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Finnish elderly care from elderly care institutions 
to informal care at home. It is mainly relatives 
who are in charge of informal home care, 
frequently without paid compensation. For 
govern mental purposes, vulnerability as a concept 
is important because of its ethical connotations 
and ideological underpinnings, such as familism 
and individualism. In the previous large health 
care reform, which reduced psychiatric hospital 
care (Helen (ed.) 2011; Alanko 2017) in Finland, 
the arguments for elderly care at home were 
based on the very same persuasive ‘language 
of vulnerability’, such as home, intimacy, and 
family—even though it was well known that 
after years spent in hospital, or even before that, 
patients did not necessarily have any family. 
One side of the benefits of the categorization 
by vulnerability is the persuasive vocabulary 
of softness and benevolence compared to the 
technical language of risk. The other side is 
economic, that of saving and cutting the public 
budget. The vulnerable are a proper target of 
political and economic actions. The justification 
of the governmental procedures is primarily 
economic, and vulnerability is economically 
productive. The classification of the elderly as 
vulnerable has brought about a change in Finnish 
elderly care and has led to the informal, home­
based, and only partly paid care provided by 
relatives. The change is productive in terms of 
governmental savings. It is ironic to note that 
the sum total, 2.8 billion Euros for care of the 
elderly, is close to the sum that is to be cut in 
the current social and welfare reform (Kehusmaa 
2014).21 As Hacking would put it, being classified 
as vulnerable a ‘wholly new kind of person came 
into being’. The elderly, classified as vulnerable, 
are not the same ‘kind of people’ as they were 
before. Similarly, the governmental budget, now 
2.8 billion Euros lighter, is no longer the same 
health care budget.
In public discourse, policy­makers, media, 
community groups, and social workers frequently 
employ this problematic construct of vulnerable 
groups in which elderly people, and those with 
disabilities are most likely to be characterized 
as vulnerable and as a group that is constructed 
as in need of being spoken for. The relationship 
between people and risk is redefined in a new 
paradigm in which people deemed vulnerable 
are considered by professionals unable to manage 
the uncertainties of life (Furedi 2003). Help to 
vulnerable people includes the assumption of the 
lack of their capacity which provides the means by 
which to discipline and control them. 
Vulnerability in the context of neoliberal 
governmentality is hardly comprehensible without 
its relationship to resilience, the ‘equivalent but 
opposite concept’. Originating from the same 
cluster as vulnerability but with a strong impact 
of development psychology, resilience is about the 
quality of the boundary but from the perspective 
of adaptability, strength and the ability to ‘bounce 
back’, to learn and develop (e.g. Garmezy 1971; 
Holling 1973; Joseph 2013). Resilience describes 
the capacity to survive and withstand but also to 
renew after a change or a catastrophe. All of the 
dimensions of resilience are considered important 
for the society’s adaptation to crises, mitigating 
disasters, and for governing the society that is 
supposed to face threats.22 
Societal and political trends put forward 
in the governmentality debates give some 
important perspectives to the question of what 
vulnerability does, or actually to the question of 
what vulnerability and resilience do. Resilience 
is fast becoming the organizing principle in 
contemporary political life, Tapio Juntunen and 
Ari­Elmeri Hyvönen (2014: 195 [italics in the 
original]) argue. According to them, the concern 
is about the detrimental effects that the meaning 
of resilience has on active citizenship and 
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democratic politics. Like several other notions 
that originate from natural sciences, resilience 
also carries with itself qualities that gain new 
meaning when applied to society. Resilience 
originates from notions such as adaptation and 
self­organizing properties which, as applied 
to society, do not recognize some of its most 
important notions, such as social change or power 
(Olsson et al. 2015: 5). The emphasis is on the 
adaptable and highly autonomous resilient subject 
and on the new social morphology where societies 
and life itself are defined by inescapable crises and 
catastrophes. Crises are regarded as unavoidable 
and, as such, a force that promotes thriving in 
society. Several political scientists have presented 
that resilience should be considered constructive 
and a promoter of societal strengthening. Brad 
Evans and Julian Reid (2015: 155–157) delineate 
a new ontology of vulnerability that is based on 
threat, endangerment, and insecurity. Violence 
and catastrophic events are considered necessary 
events in society, a vehicle for people to develop 
responsiveness to further catastrophes. Resilience 
appears as a form of immunization because 
what societies and citizens do is a process of 
internalizing catastrophic events, and this creates 
new epistemic communities that are more 
aware of their vulnerabilities. A shared sense 
of vulnerability forces people to become active 
participants in the de­politicization process of 
society. Although this scenario is debated (e.g. 
Schott 2013), it fits well with several critical 
views presented elsewhere in biopolitics and 
governmentality research. 
VUlNERablE aGENCy
In the following, I will briefly discuss vulnera­
bility as both a cultural critique of and a 
theoretical challenge to the notion of agency 
as it is applied in social sciences and most of 
all in anthropology. These debates, originating 
from anthropological studies in illness and 
critical medical anthropology,23 add some new 
perspectives to those in ethics and feminist 
studies already mentioned earlier. Illness 
provides an important contextual site for 
theorizing agency. The ill patient’s agency is 
agency, as Annemarie Mol puts it (2008: 28) 
and, according to Fineman (2008), what is 
understood as a vulnerable subject, must be 
taken seriously as the core of the legal subject. 
In this special issue, Bottner in her analysis of 
people with dementia carefully demonstrates 
how detailed ethnographic studies are able 
to open up how a variety of forms of agency 
emerge from this specific cultural context.
For most authors in this special issue, 
vulnerability is a notion that challenges ways 
of defining agency as sovereign and rational, as 
a vehicle for autonomy and individual free choice. 
The universalizing assumptions of agency render 
people vulnerable because they shape a norm, 
which runs through legal and ethical theories and 
practices, as Uusitalo and Sudenkaarne highlight, 
as well as in the care of the elderly in Bottner’s 
article. In addition, in health and welfare policy 
in most European countries, public services have 
already been becoming increasingly organized 
following consumerist principles, which 
emphasize service users’ autonomous agency and 
their rights and abilities to make choices between 
different service providers. This ‘agenda of choice’ 
(Leppo and Perälä 2009; 2017), or ‘freedom of 
choice’ (National Institute for Health and Welfare 
2019) as it is put also in the current Finnish 
health and social policy debates, is considered 
to benefit the state through more efficient and 
cheaper service provision and give citizens a 
more active role as ‘agency consumers’ of public 
services. There are, however, hidden moral and 
ethical problems embedded in discussions about 
patients as consumers and experts in health 
markets. The idea of patients’ expertise is linked 
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to an idealized picture of the individual agency 
of an invulnerable consumer being in control of 
one’s action and of vulnerable life situations as 
matters of rational choice. In addition, in these 
policy documents some people are considered 
to ‘have’ agency, others are not. The logic of the 
normative assumption is dichotomous: active 
agency is good, absence of agency is bad.
The spread of the idea of autonomous and 
sovereign individual agency is derived from 
a sociological tradition that has become tangled 
in the ‘jargon of autonomy’ (Sulkunen 2009). 
Through a dynamics of this jargon, mediated 
by medical efforts to cure and by ‘the agenda of 
choice’, society increasingly holds individuals 
responsible for their health (Rose 1996; Leppo 
and Perälä 2017). However, the agenda fails 
to explain how people actually live with illness 
(Leppo and Perälä 2017; 2009; Honkasalo 2008; 
2009). In contemporary society and in present­
day forms of governance, the patients’ agency 
and their freedom of choice are enabled by social 
structures and everyday life as well as by webs 
of implementations in the form of medications, 
technological devices, and therapeutic and peer 
support practices. 
In contexts such as illness, agency is far from 
being clear, rational, or individual. It emerges 
in and through interaction rather than being a 
given. Agency, hence, does not remain abstract 
but is enabled as real­life, worldly24 action and 
engagement with given circumstances, whether 
getting out of bed, cooking a meal, seeking 
professional help, talking to a friend, fighting an 
addiction, taking prescribed medications, coming 
to terms with technological devices within one’s 
body, or coping with stigma. In the context of 
illness and suffering, agency perhaps simply eludes 
from one’s control, becomes merely enduring, 
something that seems ‘passive’ (Honkasalo 2013; 
Mahmood 2005). What is counted as agency is 
different in different physical and mental ailments, 
as well as with regard to the availability of social 
and material resources. The link between agency 
and the myriad of worldly acts still remains 
unravelled in the bulk of anthropological research. 
In ethnographic research, the abstract, 
rational and free­floating concept of agency does 
not capture the multiple modes and ambiguous 
conditions of agency that are heightened in the 
contexts, which people themselves define as 
vulnerable. How does one capture different modes 
of agency in life situations where sovereignty, 
autonomy or individuality quite simply are 
inappropriate terms? How does one develop 
alternative concepts for social and anthropological 
theory, ones that do not suffer from futile 
abstraction, yet still maintain analytical power? 
Vulnerability has the strength of mirroring the 
problems and shortcomings of individual agency 
in everyday life because for ethnographic analysis, 
vulnerability shapes a vital contextual site for its 
theorizing. This is how Desjarlais (1997: 204–
205) puts it in his ethnography among homeless 
men in a shelter in Massachusetts. A variety of 
forms of agency emerge from this specific cultural 
context. Agency is not ontologically prior to 
context but arises from the social, political, and 
cultural dynamics of a specific time and place 
(see also Honkasalo 2008; 2009; Honkasalo and 
Tuominen 2014). These thoughts of vulnerability 
are important: they bring to the fore Arendt’s 
idea of the actor, as both sufferer and doer in 
worldly space. Beginning from the conditions 
which enable agency would be a path to the 
multiplicity of agency in addition to a notion that 
solely emphasizes control or intentionality. In her 
recent work, Sharon Krause (2015), a researcher 
in political science, highlights the importance 
of recognizing the ways people are neither free­
choicers nor sovereign as crucial conditions for 
agency and of analyses of the ways in which they 
are thwarted. 
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CONClUDING REmaRkS
How vulnerability matters is the theme of the 
special issue. As laid down by the authors, it 
matters in several ways. 
Besides an existential human condition, 
vulnerability in neoliberal societies is related to 
something commonly considered negative: with 
weakness, dependency, suffering, or identity 
practices with concomitant social control. As 
a policy imperative, vulnerability has gained an 
instrumental meaning that is a pale and narrow 
version compared to its existential and ethical 
origins. A corresponding change has also come 
about with some other notions, such as welfare 
and well­being and more recently, with the 
arts.25 Growing societal discussions highlight 
the meaning and importance of arts and artistic 
practices in an instrumental way, counted by their 
estimated well­being or health effects. 
Yet, in this special issue, through the lens 
of relationality, vulnerability is captured as an 
opening up to something unexpected that matters 
in life (Lecourt 2002 [1998]). Vulnerability affects 
and effects and this is perhaps one reason for the 
enormous popularity of the notion; it forms the 
lever between suffering and flourishing, as Martha 
Nussbaum (2001) puts it, in both—or all—
directions. Understood in this sense, vulnerability 
is about openness to something but the nature 
of this something is only determined in concrete 
social circumstances (Gilson 2018: 4). It is about 
processuality and, ethnographically speaking, 
what matters are vulnerabilities in a plural form.26 
One contribution of this special issue is to add 
to the discussions the potential of vulnerability 
to transform and be transformed in contextual 
interactions.
In this introduction, I have tracked some 
of the problems and possibilities caused by the 
stickiness of the notion along its travel through 
several intellectual and managerial deployments. 
Beyond a pure notion but merely considered 
a dispositif,27 vulnerability indicates the quality 
of boundaries ‘in a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
(…) regulatory decisions—the said as much as the 
unsaid’ (Foucault 1980: 194). 
I think that much of the enigma of 
vulnerability can be illuminated as a dispositif, ‘a 
formation that has its major function at a given 
historical moment that of responding to an urgent 
need (emphasis in the original)’. In addition to the 
affective power of vulnerability, the other reason 
for its enormous popularity is precisely the urgent 
need to govern populations in an era of insecurity 
and threat. 
In ethnographic research, the main problem 
with vulnerability consists of the multiplicity of 
meanings attached to the notion along its path 
from the natural sciences, philosophy, ethics, 
and politics to the studies of cultures, and to the 
inquiries into agency, violence, racism, and power 
as carried out in this special issue. As the concept 
of culture, vulnerability covers almost everything 
and due to its malleability, fits almost anything. 
This can be confusing and, unless carefully 
analyzed, vulnerability may cause many problems 
for concrete ethnographic research. 
Yet, as several contributions on vulnerability 
argue, vulnerability matters as a challenge and 
a possibility. Juxtaposing the notions of process, 
practice, experience, identity, or the instigator 
of affect, vulnerability is able to surpass the 
possibilities provided by many other suggested 
notion.
More than most notions, vulnerability pro­
vides a possibility to study the subtle meanings 
and qualities of boundaries. In today’s social 
and political life, this is what is urgently needed. 
Resilience is one but problematic attempt 
to contribute to this; defense, protection or 
prevention are simply not enough in the present 
day global situation. Ethically, the emphasis on 
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the porousness of boundaries and how to protect 
them are perhaps more important than ever.
NOTES
1 This special issue on vulnerability is a result 
of a long interdisciplinary and intellectual 
collaboration. As the guest editor I want to 
warmly thank all the contributors as well as 
the eleven anonymous reviewers without whose 
work and continuous interactions this anthology 
would not have been possible. I also want to 
thank Mateusz Lasczkowski, Timo Kallinen and 
Ari­Elmeri Hyvönen for their deeply insightful 
comments as well as Mark Shackleton for his wise 
close­reading and never­ending encouragement. 
I want to thank the Finnish Anthropological 
Society for accepting this special issue to the 
Journal ofthe Finnish Anthropological Society. 
I also wish to express gratitude to Matti Eräsaari, 
the editor­in­chief in particular, for his generous 
help, advices and seemingly endless patience. 
Finally, this publication was made possible by the 
Academy of Finland, grant SA 259220.
2 There are many other definitions. In the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2018), vulnerability is defined 
as a quality or state. See also Zalta (ed.) 2019. 
Resilience also has many definitions.
3 About the double­edged character of the notion 
of risk, see e.g. Giddens: ‘Yet risk is risk—the 
other side of danger is always opportunity. A lot 
of policy mistakes are being made at the moment’ 
(2009: 10).
4 About affectivity and politics of emotion more 
generally, see e.g. Ahmed 2014. 
5 See also Vulnerability and the Human Condition 
Inititative (n.d.).
6 March, 2019.
7 Engaging Vulnerability 2019.
8 See e.g. Crate, Susan and Mark Nuttall (eds) 
2016. Anthropology and Climate Change: From 
Actions to Transformations. London: Routledge; 
Fiske, Shirley, Susan Crate, Carole Crumley, 
Kathleen Galvin, Heather Lazrus, George 
Luber, Lisa Lucero, Anthony Oliver­Smith, 
Ben Orlove, Sarah Strauss and Richard Wilk 
2014. Changing the Atmosphere. Anthropology 
and Climate Change: Final report of the AAA 
Global Climate Change Task Force. Arlington: 




pdf. <accessed 23 May 2019>; Oliver­Smith, 
Anthony 2016. The Concepts of Adaptation, 
Vulnerability and Resilience in the Anthropology 
of Climate Change. In Helen Kopnina and 
Eleanor Shoreman­Ouimet (eds). The Routledge 
Handbook of Environmental Anthropology. 
London: Routledge.
9 ‘How does vulnerability matter?’ A conference 
organized by the project ‘Vulnerable lives’, 
funded by the Academy of Finland 259220. 
This special issue is based on discussions and a 
sample of papers held at the conference. Robert 
Bernasconi’s article is based on his plenary lecture 
at ‘Vulnerabilities’, a conference jointly organized 
by the Swedish Anthropological Association and 
the Finnish Society for Social Anthropology in 
Uppsala in 2018.
10 I make use of Foucault’s concept following his 
description in Power/Knowledge (1980). See the 
concluding chapter of this introduction.
11 Vulnus, a wound (noun). Vulnerare, to wound 
(verb); in the passive form, to become or be 
wounded.
12 ‘Because the actor always moves among and 
in relation to other acting beings, he is never 
merely a ‘doer’ but always and at the same time 
a sufferer. To do and to suffer are like opposite 
sides of the same coin, and the story that an act 
starts is composed of its consequent deeds and 
sufferings. These consequences are boundless, 
because action, though it may proceed from 
nowhere, so to speak, acts into a medium where 
every reaction becomes a chain reaction and 
where every process is the cause of new processes. 
Since action acts upon beings who are capable 
of their own actions, reaction, apart from being 
a response, is always a new action that strikes 
out on its own and affects others. Thus action 
and reaction among men never move in a closed 
circle and can never be reliably confined to two 
partners. This boundlessness is characteristic 
not of political action alone, in the narrower 
sense of the word, as though the boundlessness 
of human interrelatedness were only the result 
of the boundless multitude of people involved, 
which could be escaped by resigning oneself to 
action within a limited, graspable framework 
of circumstances; the smallest act in the most 
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limited circumstances bears the seed of the same 
boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes 
one word, suffices to change every constellation’ 
(Arendt 1958: 190).
13 Arendt concludes Vita Activa by stating (1958: 
390): ‘Unfortunately, and contrary to what is 
currently assumed about the proverbial ivory 
tower independence of thinkers, no other human 
capacity is so vulnerable, and it is in fact far easier 
to act under conditions of tyranny than it is to 
think’.
14 According to Watts and Bohle (1993), the 
concept of vulnerability was adopted and 
developed further by development researchers 
and poverty analysts. From their point of view, 
the concept encompasses more than merely 
observing available resources, such as disposable 
income. It also examines in what ways external 
strains like storms, floods, and droughts make 
scarcity and distribution of resources a problem. 
In more abstract terms, vulnerability means being 
exposed to external stress factors that cannot be 
overcome with the help of the resources available. 
15 Also the SANT/FAS conference ‘Vulnerabilities’, 
Uppsala, Sweden 2018.
16 Vulnerability and the Human Condition (n.d.). 
17 In addition, the field workers themselves describe 
their position as vulnerable (see e.g. Behar 1996).
18 Italian folklore research is based on a tradition 
of its own. The roots are from the history of 
religion and phenomenological philosophy but 
also the Marxist, and notably Gramscian, way of 
interpreting folk life.
19 Foucault (1988) also discusses biopolitics 
as the conceptual condition of racism and 
Nazism; Agamben (1998) pairs biopolitics with 
thanatopolitics—to him, the essence of sovereign 
power is the power to let live or let die. In this 
way how to classify the vulnerability of others is 
very central to power. 
20 See Médecins du Monde (n.d.). 
 https://mdmeuroblog.wordpress.com/
21 Kehusmaa, ibid. In Finland the homes of elderly 
people in need of medical assistance have become 
hybrids of a home and a sort of medical care unit. 
The relationship of such elderly people with their 
spouses has changed from being one of a family 
relationship to a dependence on care relationship. 
In this context, a ‘new kind of person’ is also one 
who belongs to the unpaid group of ‘informal 
care provided by family and relatives’ (Honkasalo 
2017).
22 The interest in resilience has increased remarkably 
after 9/11 and the launch of the war against 
terrorism.
23 The research project ‘Vulnerable agency’ (SA 
259220; see Honkasalo n.d.) has its ethnograph­
ical focus on the conditions of human agency—
not as an independent and autonomous entity 
as it is defined in contemporary ethical, social, 
and health policies but as an actor, tied with and 
conditioned by a web of social, political, and 
existential circumstances. They connect ill people 
and their care­takers with social interactions, be 
they at home or at hospital. What is called agency, 
autonomy, and sovereignty is also conditioned by 
the clinical and policy decisions.
24 instead of ‘agency’ , Arendt (1958) uses of ’wordly 
action’ (for a nuanced analysis, see Gambetti 
2016).
25 The vicissitudes of these notions need further 
research. The current instrumental use of the 
arts and artistic practices as a vehicle for health 
improvement and well­being has increased (see 
e.g. Sosiaali­ ja terveysministeriö 2015; Arts 
Council England 2014.
26 About Vulnerabilities, see the Swedish Anthro­
pological Association and Finnish Anthropolog­
ical Society (2018) conference Vulnerabilities.
27 I am grateful to Kristiina Brunila for our discus­
sion about the concept of dispositive. I refer to 
Foucault’s notion according to his thinking in 
Power/Knowledge (1980) and Discipline and 
Punish (1991 [1975]).
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